they wrote it but didn't read it
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The information and guidance in this field manual is hard to fault. The US military (particularly its Marine Corps and Special Forces)has long and hard-won experience in counterinsurgency and this manual reflects that. Unfortunately too many of those who conceive and plan military operations have no such experience and neither time nor inclination to read Field Manuals. Academics, students and journalists should read this manual, if only to ponder why so much of it was ignored or over-ridden in the high-level planning phase. Counterinsurgency was an almost forgotten art until the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan - this manual is useful in reminding us of three things above all. Firstly of the complexity of such operations; secondly, that the military role is only a part of the whole; and finally, that the insurgent is not so much outfought as out-thought.
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A benchmark for judging the US and UK military in Iraq
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Written as a handbook for US soldiers in overseas operations who are trying to control local resistance, it is a practical management guide.
The real interest for the general reader is how much of it applies to the current occupation of Iraq. This is a "how to" guide to dealing with insurgents, building positive relationships with local populations, strengthing the institutions of government and maintaining human rights under extreme pressure. It contains the principles against which the US army's behaviour should be judged, and by which it should judge itself.
Given the recent (August 2007) arguments in the UK about protecting interpreters, Appendix C on Linguistic Support set out in clear, practical terms how important it is that those who provide that critical service to an occupying force need and deserve protection. That part at least should be essential reading for UK government ministers.
If you are interested in Iraq and want some insight into military thinking, this is an excellent read.
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