Raising Churchill's Army by David French, 0199246300, Lowest Book Price Finder

Customer Reviews:

A well balanced account

This is an exemplary account of the army in WW2. I'm puzzled that one reviewer should find it confirming his view of the British army's 'inferiority' to the Wehrmacht. My understanding was that it learned to play from its strengths and minimise the effects of its weaknesses (as all successful armies must do). Using artillery, the RAF and set piece battles did this. It's not somehow a failure if you don't fight the battle your adversries want you to fight; rather the reverse, I would have thought. And it led to victory - the best evidence of success there is.

Thorough analysis

This book is a must for anyone who wants to understand British strategy during WW2. For me, I never understood why the British Army was so inferior to the Wermacht throughout WW2. I was confused as to why some equipment was good, why Britain was often sluggish in offensives, and why its competence levels seemed to dip (France, 1940), rise (El Alamein), and then dip again (D-Day, Normandy).

The British Army was inferior to the Germans all through the war, though it did improve. There was a lot of reasons for this. But the straight forward, simple one the author explains is that the Army was bottom of the armed service's pecking order. It came after the Navy and Air Force, which were far more important to Britain's survival than the Army. The author demonstrates this by explaining it was not until 1941 that it started to receive any decent investment at all. This is not surprising, given that the resources needed to fight the Battle of Britain, take the bombing war to Germany, and fight the war against the U-boats and German raiders were far more important than equipping an army that shouldn't be needed to defend Britain if the RAF adn navy were still effective forces. As for the Army, obsolete or inferior equipment just had to be used in the meantime because there was nothing else to us - hence why tanks like the A9 Crusader were used despite its truly dreadful performance. They were better than nothing.

This also explains why the British were so glad for American imports like the Lee, Stuart and Sherman tanks. The Churchill IV was a good tank, though it came late in the war and could not be produced in large numbers. Parts of the army that did work well - such as the Royal Artillery, were relied on heavily. Hence why British troops seemed a bit shaky on the offensive.

Equipment remained inferior to that of the Germans throughout the war, as did tactics. The mistake made by the British was to think it could fight the Germans on equal terms - but time and time again, they were embarrased. But with the introduction of Montgomery as commander of the British Army, there was a man who understood it's strengths and weaknesses. Monty's role cannot be underestimated - in the book his caution and attention to details is completely justified. Britain had very limited manpower, and in fact during the war, divisions of men had to be disbanded to make up the losses in other units.

There are a couple of weaknesses in this book. For one, it concentrates mostly on the activity in the Western theatre. And the book is a little pricey. But for all that, it's a well researched and good read.

Clear sighted account of Britain's army in WW2

David French presents a very clear and sensible account of why Britain's army developed as it did. He opens with a review of how the army was seen after the war, the boosterism that was replaced by revisionism and discusses especially well the German assessments of British performance (and some were pro, even if the most quoted were con).

He describes how from much the same experience the British and German armies went in different directions. I found especially useful the section on national perceptions. The British who favoured individuality avoided the harsher training and command structures of the Germans, but were consequently left issuing detailed orders while the more rigidly trained Germans could operate more freely because of this training.

French reviews the shortcomings of British tank design and of the opposing German vehicles. His work on artillery is very informative - one gets the impression that the Germans (Achillies-like) felt the artillery (so like Paris) was an ungentlemanly (or just unmanly) way to win wars. French clearly feels that its massed use was a sensible response to the tactical problem. Considering Alan Brooke was a gunner it was surely to be expected.

A judicious history.

The story of the British WWII 'New Model Army'.

This book details the story of the development of the British Army from the end of WWI through until the close of WWII. It illustrates a failure to match interwar doctrine to training procedures and equipment. It shows the frustrating early failures of the army to try to carry out this doctrine and it's steady realisation that the Germans were better at it. With this realisation it changes the rules that it is prepared to play by and is then almost universally succesful.

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